8 April 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Reports Furnished by Senator Keating

- 1. We have no information concerning a defection of 5 Soviets from Cuba to the US via the Quantanano Naval Base. Several collateral reports have in the past contained information concerning the alleged defection of individual Seviet personnel from Soviet units in Cuba. Most of these Soviets were reportedly shot either during or after capture by Soviet or Cuban-Soviet teams. There are no known Soviet military installations in the vicinity of the Guantanamo Naval Base.
- 2. We have no information concerning the storing of missile launchers within barracks. We know of no recent barracks build-up other than the few barrack-like buildings constructed or under construction at the several small new installations recently identified within or near the Seviet armored camps. Photography shows no apparent effort being made to move surface-to-air (SAM) missile launchers into buildings or other permanent facilities. No reduction in the number of known SAM launchers has been noted, and no additional SAM launchers are known to have been introduced into Cuba in the recent past.
- 3. Donovan has been negotiating for the release of individuals claiming US citizenship, held on a variety of charges. On his latest trip he obtained the release of two women, and was given to understand others would be released from time to time as the deliveries of the ransom goods progressed. Donovan's latest name-by-name listing of US citizens held in Cuban prisons totaled 30. In addition, there are nine skindivers who were picked up by Cuban authorities in February from a disabled boat off the coast of Cuba.

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dents of Eastern Cuba, concentrated around Santiago and employed primarily as cane-field laborers.

Claim that more than 400 of these have been trained for subversive activities, and that some of them have already returned to Haiti by clandestine means. We have no evidence of such training, however.

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In addition, we have not detected the return to Exiti of any Cuban trainees, and know of no Cuban-directed paramilitary groups in Haiti.

5. We estimated that at the height of the missile crisis there were probably about 22,500 Soviet military personnel in Cuba. During November, 5,000 carried as associated with the offensive missile complex and the IL-28 bombers were withdrawn. From February 13 through April 5, the departure of another 4,500, believed to be Soviet military personnel, has been noted by observers in Havana. We have no firm evidence as to the units from which these 4,500 may have come, and photography has not detected any reduction recently in the Seviet military installations, weapons systems, and military hardware we have identified in Cuba. On the other hand, we have never detected any large-scale activity at the four main combat element camps in Cubs, so that the absence of significant activity recently is not a valid indicator for the departure or thisning out of these units, which would be the most legical elements for withdrawal. There is some evidence that Cuban forces now may be in or adjacent to these four camps, possibly preliminary to a takeover of the equipment.

There is no justification for the statement that the Soviet forces are either stronger, or organized on a different footing, than they were in January. While we cannot preclude the arrival of some replacements, we know of no arrivals in significant numbers to offset the recent departures, and cannot support

or accept any report that "overall Soviet military personnel have not been substantially reduced."

6. We have no information concerning an alleged air strike on Haiti, but there have been a number of reports recently that Haitian exiles are seeking the backing of the Dominican administration for a move against Davalier in the near future. An

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ported on 2 April that Bosch had promised one exile group—that of Pierre Rigaud—that they could import into the Dominican Republic any small arms, ammunition, etc., that they might acquire for an attempt to unsent Duvalier.

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Among the measures being considered by Bosch as means of encouraging Duvalier's opposition is the over-flight of Haitian territory by Dominican military aircraft—a plan which may have given rise to the "air strike" report.

We have no information regarding a plan to return Paul Magloire to power in Haiti or the possible support of such a plan by elements in the Dominican Republic or the United States. Magloire and some of his supporters are among those Haitian exiles currently plotting against Duvalier, however. Any protracted cooperation between Magloire and two of the exiles mentioned by Senator Keating-General Leon Cantave and Paul Cassagnol-seems unlikely, however, in view of Magloire's arrest of the two menin the last days of his administration in December 1957.

7. We reports concerning regular clandestine voyages between Cuba and the Yucatan coast of Mexico have recently come to our attention. Considering the relatively short distances involved, the inadequacy of Mexican security personnel and equipment for an effective patrol of the coastlane, and gradually

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increasing restrictions on normal travel between Mexico and Cuba, however, such methods of transport seem entirely possible. Cuban fishing boats, Soviet fishing trawlers, and other small craft available to Cuba would easily be used in transporting men and/or arms to Yucatan and Central America.